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Abstract
A better understanding of the determinants of public health care expenditures is key
to designing effective health policies. We integrate supply and demand-side determinants,
factors from political economy and health policy reforms into an empirical analysis of the
highly decentralized Swiss health care system. We compile a novel data set of the cantonal
health care expenditure in Switzerland spanning the period 1970 - 2012. Using dynamic panel
estimation methods, we find that per capita income, the unemployment rate and the share
of foreigners are positively related to public health care expenditure growth. With regard to
political economy aspects, public health care expenditures increase with the share of women
elected to parliament. However, institutional restrictions for politicians, such as fiscal rules
and mandatory fiscal referenda, do not appear to limit public health care expenditure growth.
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1 Introduction
An ever increasing share of national income is spent on health care. This development puts
continuous pressure on public budgets and poses a major challenge for economic policy makers.
So far, an overwhelming majority of the literature has focused on supply and demand-side
explanations for the growth of health care expenditure, such as the ageing of the population,
increases in income as well as technological progress.
In this paper, we jointly investigate demand and supply side determinants, factors identified
to be of importance by the political economy literature and health policy reforms. We exploit
the highly decentralized health care system of Switzerland and focus on cantonal health care
expenditure over a period of more than 40 years (1970-2012).1 The newly compiled data set is
analyzed with the help of dynamic panel data estimation methods.
We study public health care expenditure in Swiss cantons for mainly three reasons. First, cantons
finance about two thirds of total public health care expenditure and play a key regulatory role.
Second, due to the large cantonal autonomy in designing health care policies, public health care
expenditure per capita varies enormously among cantons and across time. As illustrated in
Figure 1, the canton of Basle-City spends about six times more than the canton of Zug and
almost two times more than the canton of Geneva in 2012, i.e., 4722 Swiss francs compared to
768 and 2778 Swiss francs per capita. Health care expenditure has developed very differently
in these cantons over the last 40 years. Third, the dynamics of cantonal health care have
contributed to growing concerns regarding fiscal sustainability. Accordingly, there is a heated
debate on how to use public funds for health care in a more efficient and cost-containing way,
in particular, as to how cantonal hospitals should be organized and financed.
[Figure 1 about here]
In a first step, the paper builds upon the findings in the literature. On the demand side, the
income elasticity of public health care provision is studied. Unemployment is included as the
probability of illness is higher for the unemployed (on the micro-level) and because it is an
important indicator of the prevailing macroeconomic conditions. Furthermore, the demographic
structure as to age and immigration is taken into account. While an ageing society is expected to
increase public health care expenditure, the effect that immigration has is less clear. On the one
1While experts attest the high quality of health care services, the Swiss health care system is
one of the most expensive systems in the OECD. Total health care expenditure as a percentage
of GDP has more than doubled since 1970 and amounts to 10.9% in 2012. Long-term projections
by the Swiss Ministry of Finance suggest that health care expenditure will be in the range of
roughly 14% to 17% of GDP in 2060 (Colombier 2012).
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hand, the immigrants’ demand for public health care provision might be systematically higher
due to different preferences, a different socio-economic background and the fact that immigrants
have been more likely to work in riskier and physically more demanding jobs in Switzerland.2
On the other hand, immigrants are typically younger and healthier and therefore less likely to
use health care services than natives.3 In addition, we try to empirically capture technological
progress.
Political economists have studied the influence of political determinants on social expenditure
in general. However, the literature has not yet paid much scholarly attention to the political
economy of public health care expenditure.4 Therefore, in a second step, we investigate the in-
fluence that political economy determinants may have on public health care expenditure. First,
following the fiscal commons problem as a prominent explanation for excessive spending, we
test whether the size of parliament, as a proxy for the common pool problem with the cantonal
(health) budget, increases public health care expenditure.5 Second, as the electoral control of
politicians and the credibility of policy commitments are limited, recent research argues that the
composition of the pool of politicians in terms of gender, education and occupational background
matters for political outcomes. We investigate whether women elected to politics, who might
have a stronger preference for public health care provision, increase public health care expen-
diture (as part of social expenditure).6 Third, we integrate institutional restrictions that aim
at disciplining politicians budgetary discretion in general, i.e., fiscal rules and mandatory fiscal
referenda. Fiscal rules increase the budgetary bargaining power of the finance minister relative
to the spending ministers and create incentives for the spending ministers to be more conserva-
tive in their spending claims in order to avoid electoral punishment. Anecdotal evidence from
Switzerland suggests that the budgetary process in parliament becomes more important with
fiscal rules in place. This might lead to parliamentarians being more likely to be either stricter
2For instance, see Orrenius and Zavodny (2012) and Fletcher et al. (2011). For Switzerland,
see Taskin and Bisig (2004) who analyze the demand for health care provision depending on
socio-demographic characteristics.
3This healthy immigration effect might be reinforced if, with more immigration, natives have
to work less and in physically less demanding jobs. See Giuntella and Mazzanno (2014) for a
recent empirical analysis for Germany.
4See, for instance, Iversen (2001) and Potrafke (2009).
5See Schaltegger and Feld (2009) for the fiscal commons problem.
6See Besley (2005) for the importance of the selection of politicians for political outcomes. As
to women in politics, Chattopadyay and Duflo (2004) study the impact of political reservation
for women on local public goods provision. They find that political decision makers invest more
in public infrastructure relevant to the demand of their genders. Clots-Figueras (2011) finds that
female legislators in India invest more in health and early education and favor women-friendly
laws. Rehavi (2007) finds that a stronger presence of women in U.S. state legislatures is related
to higher state health care spending.
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in monitoring the governments spending behavior or more disciplined in proposing budgetary
amendments. In addition, we include mandatory fiscal referenda which give the citizens more
direct control over spending decisions. We test whether these institutional restrictions matter
for public health care spending. Moreover, it is empirically evaluated whether political com-
petition for upcoming elections creates incentives for incumbents to opportunistically increase
public health care expenditure in order to improve their reelection chances. Several studies
present evidence that supports the idea that partisan cycles in public spending exist. Reflecting
the spending preferences of the electorate, left-wing politicians are assumed to care more about
income distribution and to favor more expansive government spending, in particular, welfare
spending. We test whether a higher share of center-left parliamentarians in parliament increases
public health care expenditure.7
In a third step, we analyze whether health care policy reforms systematically impact public
health care expenditure. First, we examine the impact of the Federal Health Insurance Law,
which introduced mandatory basic health insurance in 1996. Mandatory health insurance was,
inter alia, introduced to achieve health care cost containment. However, it has often been
criticized as having the opposite effect. Second, we include the long-term care finance reform.
As of 2011, a new ruling on the financing of long-term care caps the burden of care costs borne
by mandatory health insurance and by persons requiring care. However, this reform, in turn, is
likely to result in additional costs for the cantons. Third, as hospital costs account for a high
proportion of public health care expenditure, we take the hospital finance reform, introduced in
2012, into account. The hospital finance reform, which introduced a prospective payment system
(Swiss DRG), provides incentives to increase hospital cost efficiency, e.g., by the reduction of
the average length of stay and, thus, could contribute to lower public health care expenditure
growth.
Based on our new dataset, we exploit the enormous variation in public healthcare expenditure
across cantons between 1970 and 2012. We use dynamic panel estimation methods and control
for time-invariant and canton-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. We find a positive and robust
elasticity of income that is close to 1. The unemployment rate is also positively related to
public health care expenditure growth. This first set of results reinforces the argument that
macroeconomic conditions exert a considerable impact on public health care expenditure growth.
As regards political economy aspects, it is found that public health care expenditure growth is
7For the relationship between fiscal rules and mandatory budgetary referenda and public
spending and debt, see, for instance, Feld and Kirchga¨ssner (2007), Luechinger and Schaltegger
(2013) and Funk and Gathmann (2011). For electoral business cycles, see Alesina et al. (1997),
Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Brender and Drazen (2005). For the partisan hypothesis, see,
for instance, Hibbs (1977) and Alesina et al. (1997) and Potrafke (2009) for respective empirical
studies.
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positively associated with the share of women elected to parliament. This result suggests that
women elected to parliament systematically differ in their preferences regarding the provision
of public health care services. However, institutional restrictions on the fiscal decision-making
power of politicians, electoral business cycles and political partisanship do not appear to matter
for public health care expenditure growth. We find no evidence for the systematic impact of the
major health care policy reforms on public health care expenditure growth in our sample.
Variation in health care expenditure has been investigated in several studies. Gerdtham and
Jo¨nsson (2000) review international cross country comparisons and first panel analyses on the
determinants of health care expenditure in OECD countries. Martin et al. (2011) review the
more recent literature and discuss income, ageing, proximity to death, technological progress
and the (de)centralized organization of health care systems in detail. According to Martin et
al. (2011), the emerging picture does not show a clear pattern of results. Recently, Hartwig
and Sturm (2014) investigated the empirically robust determinants of health care expenditure
for a rich OECD panel data set. Confirming earlier findings, GDP growth and a variable
representing Baumols cost disease theory emerge as robust determinants. As to contributions
from political economy, only few studies exist. Potrafke (2010) and Herwartz and Theilen
(2014) study OECD countries over the period 1971-2004 and 1970-2008, respectively. Potrafke
(2010) finds evidence for electoral business cycles in public health care expenditure, whereas
government ideology and coalition governments do not appear to matter. Herwartz and Theilen
(2014) also find that electoral motives influence public healthcare expenditure. They document
that partisan ideology impacts public health care expenditure, however, only in conjunction with
a sufficiently long duration of governments in power.8 Closer to our study for Switzerland are
the contributions by Crivelli et al. (2006) and Reich et al. (2012) who analyze socialized health
care expenditure in Switzerland for the period 1996 to 2002 and 1997 to 2007, respectively.9,10
While these contributions mainly focus on supply and demand-side explanations, we provide a
rich empirical analysis that integrates considerations from political economy and major health
8For the U.S. states, Joshi (2015) finds no partisan effect on health care expenditure. How-
ever, an investigation of the components of health care expenditure suggests a causal effect of
party affiliation on expenditures for prescription drugs.
9Socialized health care expenditure includes public health care expenditure and gross premi-
ums of the mandatory health insurance (including individual premium subsidies). Reich et al.
(2012) also add the cost-sharing of the insured to the dependent variable.
10The political scientists Vatter and Ruefli (2003) are the first to introduce political factors
for Switzerland. They present a cross-cantonal regression analysis of the average of health care
expenditures between 1994 and 1999 and find mixed results. Camenzind (2012) complementarily
analyzes the variation of the utilization in six health care service groups for the period 2000-
2007. He finds that a greater supply of health service providers, an older population and higher
population densities are the main drivers of utilization frequency.
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policy reforms. Moreover, we add an important time dimension to the debate and apply dynamic
panel estimation methods. We also differ with respect to results. In particular, Crivelli et al.
(2006) and Reich et al. (2012) observe a negative coefficient for income elasticity. In contrast, we
find a positive and robust partial correlation between per capita income and public healthcare
expenditure growth.
In Section 2, we briefly depict the relevant aspects of the Swiss health care system. In Section
3, the data is described and the empirical analysis is presented. Section 4 offers concluding
remarks.
2 Institutional background
Switzerland has a highly decentralized health care system, in which cantons finance about two
thirds of public health care expenditure and assume a key role. The cantons are responsible
for the planning and provision of inpatient care (acute and long-term care), the regulation
and supervision of health care matters, such as the authorization to open a medical practice
or pharmacy. The cantons operate public hospitals and subsidize private hospitals, provide
nursing homes and home care (Spitex). Cantons can delegate the provision of long-term care to
the municipal level. In any case, cantons are responsible for licensing providers of nursing homes
and home care services. The cantons are also entrusted with the implementation of the Federal
Insurance Law Act (HIA) which was put in place in 1996. This law provides new regulatory
powers for the federal government. One key element is the introduction of a mandatory basic
health insurance (OKP).11 While ambulatory care is mainly funded by the OKP (including co-
payments of private households), inpatient care is funded by the OKP and the cantons. The
cantons are required to draw up a list of hospitals and nursing homes (i.e., private and public
institutions) that are eligible for reimbursement under the OKP. Moreover, the cantons supervise
the listed hospitals and nursing homes.
Since cantons are responsible for the provision of inpatient care, we take two major recent
11The OKP offers a basic package with a uniform premium rate, which is set independently
from sex and health risks of the insured person and is uniform for adults above 25 years. The
mandatory basic insurance is offered by non-profit private health insurers, which are in competi-
tion at the cantonal level. Before 1996, the federal health insurance law as of 1911 was in place.
The law required sickness funds who sought to apply for federal subsidies to abide by its rules
such as providing a benefit package with a comprehensive coverage of health care services. The
cantons were responsible to declare such statutory health insurance as mandatory or voluntary.
Although this system suffered from serious drawbacks such as the funding of health insurance
and solidarity concerns, every attempt of the federal government to completely overhaul the
system had been rejected by the citizens until 1996.
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reforms related to inpatient care into account the new arrangement of long-term care financing,
which entered into force in 2011 and the new hospital finance regime put in place in 2012. The
legislation for long-term care financing has led to a new arrangement in the financing of long-term
care among private households, the OKP and the state. In particular, the new legislation seeks
to prevent the burden of long-term care costs on the OKP from exceeding its current level of
just under 21% and limits the amount paid by persons requiring long-term care to a maximum
of 20% of the long-term care contribution of the OKP laid down by the federal government.
The remaining long-term care costs are financed and regulated by the cantons, which have the
discretion to reduce the contribution to be paid by persons requiring care. The extra burden
due to the reform can be viewed as a fiscal externality that is caused by the cost caps for the
mandatory health insurance and persons requiring care. The key feature of the new hospital
finance regime is to move away from a cost-based reimbursement towards predetermined flat-
rate payments per case (diagnosis-related groups, Swiss DRG). Under a DRG-based financing,
providers receive a fixed rate for each admission depending on the diagnosis. This prospective
payment is known to have some shortcomings such as higher monitoring costs, revolving door
effects or incentives that encourage opportunistic behavior by providers such as up-coding and
cream-skimming, i.e., maximizing the number of lucrative patients and cases. However, the
prospective payment system is expected to provide incentives to reduce the duration of hospital
stays as hospital costs are now reimbursed on the basis of a predetermined fixed rate and not as
before on a per-diem basis. Furthermore, the flat-rate-payment scheme should lead to efficiency
gains in terms of specialization.12 In the short run, additional costs which arise from adjustments
to the new system are borne by the cantons and the OKP. Under the reformed system of the
dual financing of hospitals, the cantons and the OKP share the financing of hospitals, which
make it onto a cantonal list, in a fixed proportion. In particular, this fixed proportion has to be
achieved after a transition phase of five years and implies additional relative financing costs for
the cantons.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data
The empirical analysis is based on a novel panel data set on cantonal health care expenditures
spanning the period 1970-2012 for all the 26 Swiss cantons. Cantonal health care expenditure
consists of spending on hospitals, mental health facilities, nursing homes and outpatient nursing
12See Biorn et al. (2003), Bo¨cking et al. (2008), Chern et al. (2000), Herwartz and Strumann
(2014), Newhouse (1996) and Widmer (2015) for the relationship between prospective payment
and hospital efficiency.
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care. It does not include cantonal social allowances for health such as the cantonal contribution
to the individual premium reduction. In 2012, cantonal health care expenditure amounted to
about one fifth of total health care expenditure in Switzerland. At the same time, cantonal
health care expenditure was, on average, equal to one seventh of total cantonal expenditure. As
is illustrated by Figure 1, cantonal health care expenditure varies enormously across cantons
and over time. Figure A.1 in the Appendix illustrates the development of real public health care
expenditure over time per canton.
The data were obtained from various sources. The information on cantonal health care expen-
diture was obtained from yearly publications by the Swiss Federal Finance Administration. The
cantonal GDP per capita is provided by BAK Basel Economics. We obtained the unemployment
rate from the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs. For some cantons and very early
years, information is retrieved from the journal “Die Volkswirtschaft”. The socio-demographic
variables are taken from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. Years of election, share of left-wing
parties in parliament and the share of women in parliament are provided by the Swiss Federal
Statistical Office. For early years, we compiled information from the Anne´e Politique Suisse.
The information on parliament size, fiscal rules and mandatory budgetary referenda is obtained
from Luechinger and Schaltegger (2013), Hodler et al. (2015) and Funk and Gathmann (2011).
For early years, we retrieved the information from the annual publications of the Anne Politique
Suisse. The information on the health policy reforms is taken from the Federal Office of Public
Health.
Compared to other countries, Switzerland has relatively low unemployment rates and a high
share of foreigners which vary among cantons and across time. In 2012, the unemployment was
lowest in Obwalden (0.9%) and highest in Geneva (4.97%). In 2012, the share of immigrants
was lowest in Appenzell Inner-Rhodes (10.1%) and highest in Geneva (39.7%). After the intro-
duction of women’s suffrage, mostly in the early 1970s, the share of women elected to cantonal
parliaments increased over time and was, on average, 24% in 2012. While many cantons adopted
mandatory fiscal referenda before our observation period starts, cantonal fiscal rules have often
been introduced after the year 2000. Table A.1 in the Appendix specifies the variables and
provides summary statistics.
3.2 Methods and results
In order to estimate which determinants affect public health care expenditure growth in the
26 Swiss cantons, we use the bias-corrected least-squares-dummy-variable estimator proposed
by Bruno (2005). In contrast to the well-known estimators by Arellano and Bond (1991) and
Anderson and Hsiao (1982), this estimator holds for small panels (small N) as well. The bias
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correction is performed by the bootstrapping of the standard errors.13 The standard errors
are robust towards heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. In order to avoid non-stationarity
problems and as we are interested in explaining the dynamics rather than the levels of cantonal
health care expenditure, we carry out all estimations in first differences of the continuous vari-
ables. All continuous variables are expressed in natural logarithms.14 The baseline estimation
model is as follows:
∆ ln [phcei(t)] = α+ β∆ ln [phcei(t− 1)] + γj∆ ln[X(t)i,j ] + δjZi,j(t) + µi + λ(t) + i(t)
whereby the dependent variable phce corresponds to real health care expenditure per capita of
canton i in year t. The matrix X represents possible demand and supply-side drivers of phce
such as real GDP per capita or the mortality rate. Moreover, continuous political-institutional
factors such as the share of women in parliament and the share of left-wing parties in parliament
belong to this group of variables. Z represents a set of dummy variables which consists of
political-institutional indicator variables and major Swiss health care reforms. The error term
of the regression model is represented by . We discuss the results along three different sets of
regressions. The first set of regressions includes possible demand and supply-side drivers of phce
(model I). The second set of models adds political-institutional variables (model II) and the
last set introduces major health care reforms (model III). Furthermore, we vary the regression
models with respect to the type of fixed-effects in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity.
The first variant of regressions controls for time-invariant canton-specific effects, µi (see, for
instance, Table 1, model Ia). In a second variant, we add time-specific five-year effects, λ(t)
(see e.g. Table 1, model Ib). We do not use year fixed effects as we want to explicitly include
the indicator variables for the health reforms and the mortality rate as a proxy for technological
progress (which is only available at the federal level).
[Table 1 about here]
The first set of results of the bias-corrected least-squares-dummy-variable (LSDV) is shown in
Table 1. In all specifications, GDP per capita is statistically significant at a 1% level. We find
13The Arellano-Bond estimator is chosen to initialize the bias correction. We undertake 100
repetitions of the procedure to bootstrap the estimated standard errors. The results change
neither qualitatively with a different number of repetitions nor when we choose the Anderson-
Hsiao estimator as the initial estimator.
14Panel unit root tests indicate that the underlying panel data in growth rates are stationary.
We also controlled for the fact that we use a semi-logarithmic functional form when including
dummy variables. However, when we used the post estimation Stata command logdummy that
accounts for the semi-logarithmic functional form, the computed coefficients of the percentage
change for all dummy variables showed virtually no difference to the originally estimated dummy
coefficients. Therefore, these coefficients are not additionally inserted.
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that, ceteris paribus, an increase in income growth of one percentage point is correlated with
an increase in public health care expenditure growth of about 0.8 percentage points. Thus,
public health care seems to be more a necessity than a luxury.15 One has to keep in mind
that expenditure on nursing homes which is about one fifth of cantonal health care spending,
is, however, not driven by income considerations. The coefficient for the unemployment rate
is positive and robust across all specifications suggesting that the unemployed have a higher
probability of illness than the employed. This first set of results suggest that the two variables
characterizing the macroeconomic environment, i.e., GDP per capita and the unemployment
rate, are crucial for the development of phce. The lagged dependent variable is statistically
significant at the 1% level and the coefficient reveals an elasticity of about -0.24. Demography
is commonly argued to be an important determinant of health care expenditure. While the
coefficient of the share of the older population is positive, it is never statistically significant. A
possible explanation is that the population has been continuously ageing during the observation
period in all cantons and that it is difficult to separate the effect of ageing from the five-year
fixed effects. The share of the very young has a negative and statistically significant coefficient
in the regression without time effects. However, the coefficient turns insignificant if five-year
fixed effects are included. This confirms that the effects of the demographic structure are
difficult to separate from the time fixed effects. In order to test whether the demand patterns
of the foreign population in Switzerland for health care differ from the Swiss population, for
example, due to different preferences or a different socio-economic background, we include the
share of foreigners in our estimations. We find a statistically significant positive coefficient for
the share of foreigners. This finding may be reflected in the fact that the share of migrant
workers who have been occupied in physically demanding branches such as the construction and
manufacturing sectors is larger than the corresponding share of Swiss workers.16 However, the
decomposition of migrant workers in terms of formal education, professional training and country
of origin is changing so that this relationship is likely to be different for a shorter observation
15Our findings concerning GDP per capita stand in contrast to Crivelli et al. (2006) and Reich
et al. (2012) who find a negative coefficient of GDP per capita for a data set of Swiss cantons.
Both studies cover a shorter period, i.e., 1996-2002 (Crivelli et al., 2006) and 1997-2007 (Reich
et al., 2012) than ours, include mandatory basic health insurance contributions into the analysis
and do not use dynamic panel estimators. Our findings, however, provide clear evidence for a
positive relationship between income and public health care expenditure and are in line with
recent empirical evidence on the relationship between income and health care expenditures. See
for instance, Baltagi and Moscone (2010) for an OECD panel data analysis and Moscone and
Tosetti (2010) for an analysis of the U.S. states.
16Higher demand by the immigrants might also be due to information and access problems
to the health care systems which cause higher morbidity, in particular, for immigrants with
low formal education, language barriers and restrained financial resources (see Taskin and Bisig
2004).
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period and for future analyses. We take the mortality rate to approximate advances in medical
technology. According to our estimations, our proxy for advances in medical technology does
not systematically influence phce. However, one has to emphasize that the mortality rate is an
incomplete proxy for advances in medical technology as other factors such as the nutritional
behavior and the frequency of physical exercise can influence the mortality rate.17 Furthermore,
other regressors such as the five-year fixed effects or the GDP per capita might capture part of
the impact of advances in medical technology.18
With respect to political economy considerations, we include a rich set of institutional and
political variables. Our findings show that the size of parliament is positively related to phce.
One possible explanation is that an increasing number of parliamentarians, who all seek electoral
support from special interests in order to be reelected, increases the fragmentation of interests
in the political decision making process. This might lead to increases in public expenditure in
general and public health care expenditure in particular. However, the finding is sensitive to
the inclusion of time fixed effects. Consistent with the argument that women elected to politics
have a stronger preference for public health care spending (as a part of social expenditure),
all regressions show a statistically significant partial correlation between the share of women in
parliament and public health care expenditure growth. Neither for fiscal rules nor for mandatory
fiscal referenda, do we find a disciplining effect with regard to public health care expenditure
growth. Politicians, regardless of their partisan ideology, might hesitate to propose cuts in public
health care expenditure as such cuts are particularly visible and affect voters perceptions (see,
for instance, Pierson 1994). At the same time, citizens might regard the public provision of
health care particularly important and thus they do not vote against proposed projects, which
increase public health care expenditure, at the ballot box.
The introduction of mandatory health insurance does not systematically impact public health
care expenditure growth. With respect to the long-term care finance reform and the hospital
finance reform, we find the expected positive coefficients. However, the partial correlations are
not statistically significant. The burden shifting entailed by the long-term care finance reform
tends to increase cantonal health care expenditure. The new dual financing of hospitals in
addition to adjustment costs of the new DRG-based remuneration scheme, which are likely to
initially push up costs, are plausible explanations for the positive effect of the hospital finance
reform on public health care expenditure growth. However, as the long-term care finance reform
and the hospital finance reform have just been recently introduced on the federal level and as
17As alternative proxies for technological progress commonly used, we included the U.S. R&D
expenditure (as comparable Swiss data do not exist for our observation period) and a common
time trend. Qualitatively, we found the same results.
18Bed density could be used as a proxy of supplier induced demand in the inpatient care
sector. However, such data is available only for very recent years in the case of Swiss cantons.
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they cannot be clearly separated from time fixed effects, it is too soon to conclude about their
impact.
[Table 2 about here]
In Table 2, we add further explanatory variables of interest. In order to estimate the impact
of time-invariant socio-demographic or institutional indicator variables, i.e., Latin cantons and
cantons with a university hospital, we use a random-effects generalized least squares (GLS) es-
timator instead of our preferred dynamic panel estimator. The variable Latin cantons should
capture possibly different cultural preferences for health care between German-speaking and
Latin-speaking (French and Italian-speaking) cantons. University hospitals might incur higher
costs than ordinary hospitals due to the application of more advanced technologies. The GLS
random-effects model suggests that Latin-speaking cantons tend to have higher public health
care expenditure growth. However, once time fixed effects are included, the partial correla-
tion between the indicator variable and public health care expenditure growth is not precisely
measured. The fact that a canton operates a university hospital does not make a statistically
significant difference with regard to public health care expenditure growth (see Table 2, models
Ia and Ib). In addition, we test the potential impact of two further prominent political-economy
variables, i.e., electoral business cycles and partisan influences. In the second specification
(model II) in Table 2, we, again, apply the dynamic panel estimator proposed by Bruno (2005).
This specification is run separately from Table 1 due to the lack of availability of data in some
cantons. While electoral budget cycles are captured by an election year dummy, partisan influ-
ence is approximated by the share of left-wing politicians in parliament as an additional measure
of the spending preferences of the electorate. As left-wing politicians are assumed to care more
about income distribution and to favor more expansive government spending and government
intervention, a higher share of left-wing politicians is expected to increase public health care
expenditure. The empirical analysis, however, suggests that both factors do not contribute to
explaining the dynamics of phce and do not alter the main results. While the result for the
partisan ideology is in line with the findings of Potrafke (2010) and Joshi (2015), it stands in
contrast to the studies by Potrafke (2010) and Herwartz and Theilen (2014) with regard to the
effect that electoral motives in election years have on public health care expenditure. This might
be due to the fact that Switzerland features consensus governments. Moreover, local autonomy
and strong direct democratic participation rights discipline politicians and additionally reduce
the importance of electoral budgetary cycles and ideological differences.19
19In further robustness checks, we, first, tested whether our results are affected by the interplay
of cantonal and local health care expenditures. Local health care spending is quantitatively much
less important than cantonal spending. However, the cantons have the competences to delegate
11
4 Concluding remarks
This paper has empirically studied the determinants of public health care expenditure growth.
Exploiting the highly decentralized Swiss health care system, we integrate supply and demand-
side considerations, factors identified by the political economy literature and major health pol-
icy reforms. Based on a novel data set spanning the period 1970-2012, we find evidence that
income per capita, unemployment and immigration impact the dynamics of public health care
expenditure. With respect to political economy considerations, it is found that public health
care expenditure growth increases with the presence of women in parliament. However, elec-
toral business cycles, political partisanship and institutional restrictions on the discretionary
budget decision making power of politicians do not appear to affect public health care expen-
diture significantly. The result regarding fiscal rules might imply that with fiscal rules in place
and increasing public health care expenditure over time, other competing public expenditure
categories are subject to more budgetary discipline. Moreover, our empirical analysis suggests
that the major Swiss health care reforms have not systematically influenced public health care
expenditure growth. However, the long-term care finance reform and the hospital finance reform
have only recently been introduced and it is too soon to conclude about their impact.
There are several issues that would merit further research on this topic. First, one could focus
on inpatient expenditure, as it constitutes the principal part of cantonal health care expendi-
ture. The recently implemented long-term care finance reform and the hospital finance reform
primarily concern the financing of hospitals. Second, Baumol’s cost disease might play a role for
public health care expenditure. Third, it would be interesting to investigate the determinants of
public health care expenditure at the local level. Moreover, while we provide an analysis of the
determinants of the variation in public health care expenditure, a comparative analysis on the
corresponding consequences for the composition of total cantonal (welfare) expenditure could
yield interesting insights for policy makers.
the provision of health care services to the local level. While further analyses suggest that
(some) cantons shift part of the fiscal burden to the local level, our results for the determinants
of cantonal health care expenditure are not affected if we take the dynamics of local healthcare
expenditure into account.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Cantonal health care expenditure per capita
(in Swiss francs)
Note: Since 2008 only cantonal net contributions to public hospitals are taken into account.
This revision of the government finance statistics led to a one-time downward shift in cantonal
health care expenditure due to accounting reasons.
Source: Swiss Federal Finance Administration.
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Table 2: Determinants of public health care expenditure in Swiss cantons (1970-2012)
Further analyses
Dependent variable: ∆log real public health care expenditure per capita
Ia Ib IIa IIb
Real cantonal GDP per capita 0.80* 0.81* 0.85*** 0.92***
(0.42) (0.44) (0.20) (0.21)
Unemployment rate 0.07** 0.07** 0.07** 0.07**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Share of population above 64 0.59 0.39 0.55 0.47
(0.36) (0.41) (0.58) (0.65)
Share of population below 6 –0.56* –0.06 –0.91*** -0.16
(0.34) (0.46) (0.30) (0.37)
Share of foreigners 0.41 0.56 0.52** 0.77**
(0.29) (0.50) (0.22) (0.30)
Mortality rate 0.07 0.19 –0.06 0.12
(0.29) (0.32) (0.31) (0.34)
Parliament size 0.33** 0.30** 0.27 0.18
(0.13) (0.13) (0.17) (0.17)
Share of women in parliament 0.07 0.06 0.06** 0.04
(0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Years of election 0.003 0.005
(0.01) (0.01)
Share of left-wing parties in parliament 0.04 0.03
(0.04) (0.04)
Fiscal rule 0.003 0.005 0.02 0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Mandatory fiscal referendum 0.006 0.005 –0.001 –0.003
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)
Mandatory health insurance –0.002 –0.002 –0.02 0.001
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
Long-term care finance reform 0.04* 0.06*** 0.03 0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06)
Hospital finance reform 0.06* 0.06 0.08 0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
– continued on next page –
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Table 2 – continued
Ia Ib IIa IIb
Latin cantons 0.01* 0.01
(0.007) (0.007)
Cantons with university –0.005 –0.01
hospital (0.007) (0.007)
Lagged public health care –0.24*** –0.25***
expenditure per capita (0.03) (0.03)
Cantonal fixed effects - - yes yes
Five-years fixed effects no yes no yes
No. of observations 1035 1035 962 962
No. of cantons 26 26 25 25
R2 (as%) 19 21 26 27
Notes: All continuous variables are in first differences and expressed in logarithms. Columns Ia
and Ib: Random-effects GLS estimator and HAC standard errors. Columns IIa and IIb: Bias-
corrected dynamic panel estimator with bootstrapped standard errors as proposed by Bruno
(2005). ***, **, and * indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. All esti-
mations include a dummy variable for the revision of the Swiss government finance statistics
in 2008. Latin cantons: Fribourg, Geneva, Jura, Neuchatel, Ticino, Vaud and Wallis. Cantons
with university hospital: Basel-City, Berne, Geneva, Vaud and Zurich. Years of elections include
elections for the executive or/and the legislative bodies. In columns IIa and IIb, no information
on the share of left wing parties (Social Democratic Party and Green Party) is available for the
canton Appenzell Inner-Rhodes and for Appenzell Outer-Rhodes until 2003. See Table 1 for
further details.
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Appendix
Figure A.1: Cantonal health care expenditure per capita (1970-2012)
Notes: Since 2008 only cantonal net contributions to public hospitals are taken into account.
This revision of the government finance statistics led to a one-time downward shift in cantonal
health care expenditure due to accounting reasons.
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Table A.1: Descriptive statistics
Observations Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Dependent variable
Real public health care expenditure
per capita 1109 1’185.46 882.65 25.35 5’449.41
Independent variables
Real GDP per capita 1102 49’827.6 15’939.2 22’048 141’206.9
Unemployment rate 1109 1.69 1.73 0 7.81
Share of population above 64 1108 14.63 2.48 8.29 21.04
Share of population below 6 1108 7.25 1.39 4.16 11.97
Share of foreigners 1084 16.15 6.91 4.94 39.66
Mortality rate 1109 682.94 151.73 455.8 987.5
Parliament size 1109 113 45.84 45 204
Share of women in parliament 1109 15.29 10.21 0 37
Share left-wing parties in parliament 1033 21.06 10.79 0 47.7
Independent variables (dummies)
Years of election 1109 0.31 0.46 0 1
Fiscal rule 1094 0.23 0.42 0 1
Mandatory fiscal referendum 1109 0.66 0.47 0 1
Mandatory health insurance 1109 0.40 0.49 0 1
Long-term care finance reform 1109 0.047 0.21 0 1
Hospital finance reform 1109 0.023 0.15 0 1
Note: The summary statistics are shown in levels for the full sample covering the years 1970-
2012. As the first observation for the newly founded canton Jura is 1979, we have 1109 instead
of 1118 observations in our sample. For independent variables that are coded as dummies, mean
values indicate the share of observations that have the specific characteristic indicated by the
label of the respective variable. The values for the GDP per capita are in real Swiss francs.
For the years 1970-1979, real GDP per capita is retropolated with the growth rate of the real
cantonal income. From 1980 onwards, information is provided by BAK Basel Economics. The
mortality rate is defined as the standardized number of deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. The
reduced number of observations for the share of population above 64, the share of population
below 6, the share of foreigners and the fiscal rule are due to data availability. No information
on the share of left-wing parties (Social Democratic Party and Green Party) is available for the
canton Appenzell Inner-Rhodes and for Appenzell Outer-Rhodes until 2003.
Sources: Swiss Federal Finance Administration for the dependent variable. BAK Basel Eco-
nomics and Swiss Federal Statistical Office for real GDP per capita. For the unemployment
rate, see Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs and the journal “Die Volkswirtschaft”.
For the socio-demographic variables, see Swiss Federal Statistical Office. For years of election,
share of left-wing parties in parliament and the share of women in parliament, see Swiss Federal
Statistical Office and Anne´e Politique Suisse. Luechinger and Schaltegger (2013), Hodler et al.
(2015) and Funk and Gathmann (2011) and the Anne´e Politique Suisse for parliament size, fiscal
rules and mandatory fiscal referendum. For health policy reforms, see Federal Office of Public
Health.
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